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1
The end of World War I brought a radical change of the political map of Cen-
tral Europe. The Habsburg Monarchy broke up and the so-called successor 
states were constituted on its fundamentals. Besides Austria and Hungary, 
they included Czechoslovakia, Poland, Rumania and the Serb-Croat-Slovene 
State. The constitution of the successor states was confi rmed at the Paris Pea-
ce Conference. The Peace Treaties resulting from it gave an international-le-
gal full stop to the war confl ict. The concept of the Versailles peace system 
benefi ted most the victorious successor states. The Versailles peace system 
brought dramatic limitation of the political power of the defeated successor 
states of Austria-Hungary, i.e. for Austria and Hungary, not only in the actual 
Central European region. The adaptation to new post-war internal and exter-
nal political conditions was very complicated for the latter, i.e. Hungary. The 
result of the search for new state identity of post-war Hungary was the birth 
of the interwar, so called Horthyan Hungary at the turn of 1919 and 1920 
with specifi c semi-authoritative regime. From constitutional perspective, 
the interwar Hungarian state was based on civic parliamentarianism with 
all appropriate bodies, but with autocratically regulated form or activity in 
practice. The foundations of the semi-authoritative interwar Hungarian 
kingdom were laid by the conservative Christian-national political course 
that had seized power in August 1919, pushing the civic-democratic political 
powers, including social democracy, that had striven to build civic-democra-
tic post-war Hungary like the Western democracies at the turn of 1918 and 
1)  The article constitutes a part of solution of the Grant Project No. P410/10/P140, Czecho-
slovak-Hungarian bilateral relationships on the background of home aff airs development of 
Horthyan Hungary in 1919–1927, funded by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic.
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the monarchy, the latter divided into further two antagonistic camps – die-
hard legitimists, i.e. supporters of the Habsburg house and uncompromising 
supporters of free election of the king. But the sharp diff erentiation of the 
society of the country, based on political beliefs, was complemented by spon-
taneous anger against the surrounding world due to the international-legal 
enforcement of territorial curtailment of the country, which united the so-
ciety virtually across the whole Hungarian political scene. The feeling of ho-
pelessness, bitterness and loss of rights due to the status of defeated country 
constituted the greatest trauma of the society of interwar Hungary. The in-
terwar Hungarian society was not able to fi ght down the national feeling of 
grievance, resulting from the deep-rooted thousand-year-long tradition of 
natural unity of the lands Lands of St Stephen’s Crown during the whole so 
called Horthyan period of the Hungarian history.
Although the Hungarian peace treaty between the Allied and Asso-
ciated Powers and Hungary, i.e. the confi rmation of the borders of post-war 
Hungary, was signed only on 4 June 1920, its oppressive territorial provisi-
ons had been set in fact a year before, in June 1919, by decision of the supre-
me Entente representatives to the Paris Peace Conference. The area of Hun-
gary decreased by two thirds, from 282 thousand km2 (without Croatia)3 to 
93 thousand km2.2 Thus the territory of the Hungarian State was reduced by 
almost 190 thousand km2 that passed to Rumania, Czechoslovakia, Yugosla-
via and Austria. The number of inhabitants of Hungary dropped from 18,3 
million (without Croatia)4 to 7,9 million, and up to one third of Hungarians 
found themselves outside the Hungarian State.
The above stated confl ict of interwar Hungarian society based on 
political beliefs was overcome very diffi  cult too; its deep roots were nou-
rished by post-war revolutionary period under the sign not only of the red 
but also the white terror; the excesses of the white terror outlasted until 
1920 when not only the internal but also the very fragile external sensitivity 
to such pathological phenomena in the Hungarian society at that time 
brought gradual termination or at least marked restriction of the abnormal 
persecution practices of the diffi  cultly controllable paramilitary groups. The 
distinctive confl ict of the society on political base was not in fact completely 
warded off  during the whole period of interwar Hungary, particularly due to 
the semi-authoritative regime in the country symbolized by the regent of the 
3)  With Croatia 329 thousand km2 in total.
4)  With Croatia 20,8 million in total.
1919, to the margin of the political spectrum. The goal of this study is to 
summarize synoptically the important internal moments of the birth of so 
called Horthyan Hungary that had predetermined its basic character and 
development during the whole interwar period, as well as the beginning of 
consolidation of the country and short outline of its course.
Summary of social-political and economic situation of Hungary at the turn 
of 1919 and 1920
Hungary experienced the most complicated immediate post-war develop-
ment of all successor states of Austria-Hungary. It was burdened not only 
by the consequences of the state-legal revolutionary turns from 1918 and 
1919 but also by the occupation of a part of the country by the Rumanian, 
Yugoslavian or French armies. The Rumanian army had been occupying 
the Hungarian territory to the east of Tisza River since April 1919, after 
having it taken during the anti-Hungarian push during the Hungarian 
Republic of Councils. But on 4 August 1919, the Rumanian army took also 
the capital of the country, Budapest, in spite of the prohibition by the Paris 
Peace Conference. The Rumanian army stayed in the capital until autumn, 
14–16 November when the Rumanians left not only Budapest but also the 
territory between the Danube and Tisza rivers. The army of the Serb-Croat-
Slovene State occupied larger part of the Baranya County including the 
town of Pécs in the south of Hungary from 1918. The territory was abando-
ned and transferred under the sovereignty of Hungary only in August 1921 
upon pressure of the Entente Powers, after the failed declaration of local 
Serbian-Hungarian Republic. During the existence of the Hungarian Re-
public of Councils,2 smaller part of today’s Southern Hungary including 
the town of Szeged was occupied by the French army, under whose protecti-
on the conservative anti-revolutionary opposition and the National Army 
lead by the Admiral Miklós Horthy de Nagybánya, the future head of state 
of interwar Hungary was organized.
A signifi cant factor aff ecting the formation of the shape of inter-
war Hungary consisted in the insurmountable division of the society into 
several implacable camps – supporters of the left wing and the right wing in 
all their shades, further into supporters of the republic and supporters of 
2)  The Hungarian Republic of Councils lasted from 21 March 1919 to 1 August 1919.
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The economic fall of the country was naturally combined with di-
sastrous social situation. The living standard of state offi  cials and offi  cers 
dropped, as compared to the situation of pre-war years 1913–1914, by up to 
82–87 % and that of workers by 61–74 %. The number of unemployed excee-
ded the acceptable limit by far. About one third of workers were unemploy-
ed. The unemployment statistics were further markedly negatively changed 
also by the infl ux of refugees from the separated territories. Almost 350 
thousand of registered refugees moved to post-war Hungary due to forced 
leaving of their original residence. The major part of them came from the 
end of 1918 until the end of 1920. The territorially markedly diminished 
Hungary was thus confronted with unsolvable problem of having to employ 
up to 235 thousand intellectual workers in a country with about eight milli-
ons of inhabitants. The situation was worsened even more by the need of 
placement of signifi cant part of offi  cers and non-commissioned offi  cers of 
the army whose staff  had been reduced to maximally allowed limit of 
35 thousand men due to the peace treaty.7
Accession to power of Christian-national political course
In spite of the social-political problematic and economic aspects that had 
complicated markedly the return of Hungary to peaceful and calm recon-
struction of the country and made considerably more diffi  cult the adaptati-
on of the country to the new post-war internal and external political situati-
on, last but not least predestining markedly the specifi c character of the 
internal political atmosphere in the country in that period, during the se-
cond half of 1919, after the fall of the Republic of Councils, conditions lea-
ding to assertion of the desired internal standardization were established in 
the country. The political situation of Hungary was naturally not calmed 
down immediately by the fall of the “Soviet” Republic in summer 1919.
The situation in Hungary after the fall of the Republic of Councils 
showed stalemate character. István Friedrich, the new Hungarian Prime Mi-
nister who had thrown down the Prime Minister Gyula Peidl governing on top 
of the unicolour socialist, the so called trade union government, only six days8 
7)  BALOGH, p. 138. E. IRMANOVÁ, Maďarsko a versailleský mírový systém, Ústí nad Labem 
2002, p. 198.
8)  Gyula Peidl’s government held power less than a week, from 1 to 6 August 1919.
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country, the temporary head of state, Admiral Horthy. The established regu-
lated political system did not allow full opening of the political scene, as was 
usual in the Western democracies at that time and kept nourishing the ho-
stile division of the society into the “state-constituting” Christian-national 
and agrarian right wing and into the left wing, dangerous and unacceptable 
to the state, together with the civic-democratic political stream blamed for 
having passed the power in the country to communists on 21 March 1919.
But the international-political isolation of post-war Hungary and ir-
reconcilable political diff erentiation of post-war Hungarian society, inherited 
from hectic revolutionary months, did not constitute the only obstacles to suc-
cessful start of internal consolidation of the country. Another crucial hinde-
ring aspect of stabilization of post-war Hungary consisted in the burdening 
economic and social situation of the country, worsened even more during the 
revolutionary events of 1918 and 1919. Hungary entered the new phase of its 
history with completely wrecked economic life, not only due to war but also 
due to considerable territorial losses. For example the production of the coun-
try in 1920, the year of the fi rst ordinary post-war elections, the year of peace 
negotiations with Hungary and the year of enforcement of consolidation course 
in the country constituted about 20–30 % of the level of 1913. But the deepest 
drop was experienced by the agrarian production, typical to Hungary. The ex-
port of corn dropped by one half in 1920, as against the average of 1913.5
Another indicator of the lamentable condition of the economy of 
the country rose to the skies. The post-war fi nancial situation of Hungary 
was virtually disastrous. The paralyzed economic life of the country during 
the war years devalued the common Austrian-Hungarian crown by 60 %. But 
in summer 1919, the crown dropped down to 15 % of its original pre-war 
value. The continuing dramatic fall of the crown is well illustrated by its 
rapidly dropping value as against the Swiss franc. While in August 1919, 100 
crowns were equal to 11.6 Swiss francs, in June 1920 the value of 100 crowns 
as against the Swiss currency dropped to mere 3.1 francs. In consequence of 
the rapid revolutionary events in immediate post-war period, the Hungarian 
fi nancial policy found itself in chaotic web of provisional measures. The Go-
vernment was able to cover the state budget only by disproportionate print 
of paper banknotes.6
5)  M. ROMPORTLOVÁ, Z. SLÁDEK, Hospodářský a sociální vývoj ve střední a jihovýchodní 
Evropě, Brno 1994, p. 65.
6)  S. BALOGH (ed.), Magyarország a XX. században, Budapest 1985, pp. 137 and 139.
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tional Rumanian army that supervised virtually all political and cultural 
life even in the political centre of the country. The main goal of the direct 
entry into the events in Hungary was the retreat of the Rumanian army 
from the country, demanded ineff ectively by the Entente from the Rumani-
an government since long time, and particularly the eff ort to mediate the 
formation of a government cabinet with broader political mandate that 
could be sent an invitation to the Paris Peace Conference and that would be 
allowed to hold fi nally the parliamentary elections in the country. A turn 
towards direct active policy of the Entente as against Hungary took place in 
direction of the Anglo-American diplomacy.12
Sir George Russel Clerk, a British diplomat, was charged with the 
mediating role at the Hungarian internal scene and his mediating political 
mission in Hungary started on 23 October.13 During the mission, the retreat 
of the Rumanian army from central part of Hungary and the handover of 
the territory left by the Rumanians to the National Army lead by Horthy was 
fi nally achieved. Thanks to that, Horthy who managed the strongest milita-
ry power of the country worked his way to the very top of the political events 
and his infl uence and authority immediately exceeded the previous frame of 
army commander. Therefore Horthy played an important role from his 
strengthened and legalized power position even in the complicated internal 
political negotiations under Clerk’s direction. The diffi  cult Clerk’s negotiati-
ons with the representatives of the decisive political streams of the country 
were fi nally successfully completed on 24 November by formation of the 
new, so called concentration government lead by Károly Huszár, the Prime 
Minister, and by its subsequent recognition by the Paris Peace Conference on 
25 November. Only then the Entente expressed its readiness to negotiate 
with Huszár’s government as the “temporary de facto cabinet” of Hungary, 
until a government refl ecting the voters’ would be created in the country on 
12)  Gy. JUHÁSZ, Magyarország külpolitikája 1919–1945, Budapest 1987, pp. 43–46; K. SALAM-
ON, Nemzeti önpusztítás. 1918–1920. (Forradalom–proletárdiktatúra–ellenforradalom), Bu-
dapest 2001, p. 190, or p. 195; IRMANOVÁ, p. 167. F. BOROS, Magyar-csehszlovák kapcsola-
tok 1918-1921-ben, Budapest 1970, pp. 94–96 and 116–119.
13)  For more details on Clerk’s mission see Gy. RÁNKI, A Clerk-misszió történetéhez, Történelmi 
Szemle, 1967, 2, pp. 156–187.
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and had put the Archduke Joseph the Habsburg, member of the Hungarian 
branch of the Habsburg family, to the top of the country as homo regius,9 did 
not want to resign, in spite of repeated calls of the Entente. The Entente did 
not want to recognize Friedrich as political partner for his bold political expe-
riment of restoration of the Habsburg power in the country10 even after the 
archduke’s resignation and after the subsequent extension of the Cabinet by 
non-Christian-national politicians and start of active preparations of the fi rst 
ordinary post-war parliamentary elections in the country, on the base of broad 
right to vote in compliance with the ideas of the Entente. Nevertheless, it was 
during Friedrich’s function as Prime Minister that the Christian-national po-
litical course was established in the country and gave birth to so-called Hor-
thyan Hungary. The main political stream of interwar Hungary, the Christi-
an-national stream, was formed out of neo-conservative and moderate 
conservative liberal political groups of dualistic Hungary of the turn of the 
19th and 20th centuries.
Diplomatic mediation at the stalemate Hungarian internal politi-
cal scene became key to the stalemate political situation in the country with 
missing united power centre or state-wide authority of the Hungarian admi-
nistration that “shared” the control in the country with the ascending po-
wer of the high commander of the so called National Army, Admiral Miklós 
Horthy11 and was additionally under control of the command of the occupa-
9)  Archduke Joseph the Habsburg stayed on top of the country only half month (16 days), 
until 23 August.
10)  Compare Sir Clerk’s speech at the interparty conference within his mediation on the Hun-
garian political scene on 17 December 1919 when he confi rmed the fact of non-recogni-
tion of the Prime Minister Friedrich by the Entente because of his eff ort to restore the 
Habsburg state power through the regency of Joseph the Habsburg. See e.g. Népszava, 47, 
232, 19 December 1919, pp. 2–3, or p. 3 (Clerk George beszéde a hétfői pártközi konferen-
cián). Compare also IRMANOVÁ, pp. 134–135.
11)  Horthy became offi  cial the high commander of the National Army of the country, i.e. of all 
anti-revolutionary armed forces in the regions not controlled by the Rumanians after 
having sworn in as “high commander of all armed forces in the country” before homo regi-
us, Joseph the Habsburg, in presence of István Friedrich, the Prime Minister, on 15 Au-
gust 1919 (for the original record of Horthy’s swear see Hungarian State Archive (Magyar 
Országos Levéltár, MOL), K 26. Miniszterelnökség (hereinafter referred to only as ME), 
1919 – I. – 4405, fol. 3–4, or p. 2; quoted from ibidem). Compare also F. PÖLÖSKEI, Horthy és 
hatalmi rendszere. 1919–1922, Budapest 1977, pp. 23–24.
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So Huszár’s cabinet was concentration cabinet only on the surface, 
with regard to its composition in eff ectu. Also Károly Huszár’s Government 
provided the greatest share of governmental power to the Christian-national 
political course. Most essential positions in the concentration government 
were occupied by ministers from Christian parties, i.e. ministers from the so 
called Christian bloc, and the governmental policy of the new Cabinet went 
on fully corresponding with the governmental policy of the Prime Minister 
István Friedrich. The shape of the Cabinet constituted victory of the strong 
position of the Christian-national course and refl ected the fact stated by 
Ernő Garami, the president of the Hungarian social democracy in an inter-
view with a collaborator of Az Újság, a liberal newspaper, during the fi nis-
hing interparty negotiations under Clerk’s direction by mid-November: “The 
parties disposing of governmental power imagine concentration so that the 
existing political line would be fully preserved, the current principles of the 
regime would be unaff ected and the power would stay in the hands of the par-
ties governing today. Democratic parties, in position of one-two also-rans, 
would help to present the impression that not a compact government party 
but a concentration cabinet holds the power…“19 That meant: the very compo-
sition of the coalition and concentration cabinet predetermined on whom 
detention and on whom possession will fall.
The position and authority of the new government was strengthe-
ned, as against Friedrich’s cabinet, by the “unreserved” support of Horthy, 
the chief commander of the National Army. After Clerk’s recognition of the 
National Army organized by Horthy as the only guarantee of order in the 
country after the Rumanian occupational army had left Budapest, the high 
command became the second power centre in the capital as well. And it was 
a signifi cant power centre. The power relationship between the central go-
vernmental administration and the high command is fi ttingly illustrated by 
the observations of an unnamed citizen of the Serb-Croat-Slovene State from 
his considerably long stay in Budapest, published in the Czech Národní listy 
newspaper. “The Hungarian government has a quite inferior position besides 
Horthy. Horthy often gives commands that are not in compliance with their 
decisions. In Pest20 itself, he acts as if there is no authority besides him, and 
19)  Az Újság, 17, 156, 16 November 1919, p. 5 (Hétfőn dől el az ország sorsa. – Garami Ernő 
nyilatkozata).
20)  To wit Budapest.
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the base of the results of parliamentary elections.14 So only the seventh post-
war Hungarian Cabinet,15 or the fi fth post-war Hungarian Prime Minister 
obtained recognition of the Entente Powers.16 
The new twelve-member Cabinet included, besides fi ve representa-
tives of the Party of Christian National Union (Keresztény Nemzeti Egyesülés 
Pártja) including the Prime Minister, three representatives of the Christian 
Smallholder Party (Keresztény Földmíves Párt) and one member of the more 
liberal smallholders, the Statewide Smallholder and Agrarian Party (Orszá-
gos Kisgazda- és Földműves Párt), i.e. nine representatives of the so called 
Christian bloc in total. The National Liberal Party (Nemzeti Liberális Párt) got 
one ministerial position but its representative in the Cabinet represented 
the conservative fraction of the party that was close to the policy of the Chri-
stian bloc.17 Each of the liberal National Democratic Party (Nemzeti Demokra-
ta Párt) and the Social Democratic Party (Magyarországi Szociáldemokrata 
Párt), i.e. the real representatives of the proclaimed concentration, got one 
ministerial position in the new governmental team.18
14)  Compare the text of Clerk’s note to the new Hungarian Prime Minister Károlyi Huszár, on 
behalf of the Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference from 25 November 1919 in: 
MOL, K 27, ME., Minisztertanács (hereinafter referred to only as MT), 25 November 1919 
(box No. 123), pp. 4–6, or pp. 4–5.
15)  Without three governmental formations of the socialist-communist government, the so-
called Revolutionary Directive Council of Sándor Garbai under the Hungarian Republic 
of Councils.
16)  PÖLÖSKEI, pp. 41–56; SALAMON, particularly pp. 197–207; IRMANOVÁ, pp. 136–138. 
For the history of Horthy’s infl uence in anti-revolutionary period compare PÖLÖSKEI, 
pp. 22–30 and I. ROMSICS, Ellenforradalom és konszolidáció: A Horthy-rendszer első tíz 
éve, Budapest 1982, pp. 72–74. See here further the record from the meeting of the 
Cabinet from 24. and 25 November 1919. In MOL, K 27, ME., MT., 24 November 1919 
(box No. 123) and MT, 25 November 1919 (ibidem), point 2 of the agenda of the Cabinet 
meeting.
17)  Compare e.g. the comment on the political situation or the attitude to current political 
issues of an unnamed leading representatives of the party, “close to the Government”, 
expressed to the editor of the newspaper Az Újság during the days of the December Gov-
ernment crisis in connection with the submitted requirements of social democracy. Az 
Újság, 17, 183, 18 December 1919, pp. 1–2 (In Holnap dől el a politikai válság).
18)  SALAMON, pp. 206–207.
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departments (army, interior, fi nance, justice and commerce) mastering fo-
reign languages and post clerks. 23
Also purposeful reduction of freedom of assembly and association 
should contribute to protect the ideological base of the Christian-national 
post-revolutionary or anti-revolutionary governmental course. The right of 
free assembly and association was restricted by specifi c orders from the pe-
riod of Friedrich as Prime Minister, and their reduction continued later un-
der the fi rst cabinet of Count Pál Teleki in the course of 1920.24 The measures 
adopted in this connection under István Friedrich were left unchanged also 
under Huszár’s concentration cabinet.25
The counter-revolutionary justice measures that cast much stron-
ger shadow on the germinating interwar political system of Hungary beca-
me a lot more striking. The mass “justice” sanction of “enemy creatures” by 
the state administration had been asserted under Friedrich as Prime Mini-
ster already, and it continued also in the period of Huszár’s concentration 
cabinet. Besides the governmental decree of the counter-revolutionary re-
gime on “temporary modifi cation of justice”, adopted under Friedrich’s se-
cond cabinet,26 it was particularly the ministerial internment decree that 
highlighted the most the authoritarian tendencies of the germinating politi-
cal system in Hungary. The internment legal standard in form of the mini-
sterial decree was issued just under Huszár’s government, although it star-
ted being prepared still under Friedrich as Prime Minister.27 The internment 
decree of the Minister of the Interior “on remanding in custody of persons 
dangerous from the perspective of state safety or from the perspective of pu-
blic order and safety, arousing fears and suspicious and harmful for econo-
23)  Ibidem, p. 78.
24)  Teleki’s fi rst governmental cabinet administered the country from 19 July 1920 to 14 
April 1921, when it resigned after the fi rst restoration attempt of Karl the Habsburg.
25)  PÖLÖSKEI, pp. 79–82.
26)  The governmental decree of the second Friedrich’s cabinet not only restored the dualistic 
legal standards in the fi eld of justice (see gov. decree No. 4038/1919 ME. in: Rendeletek Tára, 
Budapest, Magyar Kir. Belügyminisztérium, 1919, pp. 647–651), but on the base of Act 1912: 
LXIII. on exceptional measures for the case of war it introduced also abbreviated procedure 
in criminal proceedings (see § 1 and 2 of gov. decree 4039/ 1919. ME., ibidem, pp. 651–656, or 
p. 652). For anti-revolutionary criminal measures compare briefl y e.g. PÖLÖSKEI, pp. 57–60.
27)  PÖLÖSKEI, p. 62.
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therefore frequent confl icts between the civil and military power occur.”21 The 
power infl uence of the high command on the Government was indisputable 
up to such level that it can be stated that in fact, the army did not serve to 
civil administration but rather the contrary. The strong position of the high 
command was obvious also at later assertion of Horthy to the function of 
temporary head of state, but also at his actual election to the top of the coun-
try by the fi rst legislative body of interwar Hungary, created on the base of 
the fi rst post-war parliamentary elections.
The base to continue further strengthening of the semi-authori-
tative tendencies of the arising political system based on purposeful cor-
rection of civil rights in compliance with national interests, from the posi-
tion of the view of the Christian-national governmental course, had been 
given to the concentration Huszár’s Government by Friedrich’s administra-
tion already. The basic preventive measure of the new counter-revolutiona-
ry political direction was strict control of press. The political censorship of 
the press had been applied by the command of the Rumanian army during 
the whole period of their presence in the capital already. But the “offi  cial” 
censorship of the state apparatus was only one of the obstacles to the “non-
Christian” and “non-national” press. The press, “dangerous” from the au-
thoritative national-Christian perspective, was independently censored 
also by the high command. So the practice was, in the end, so that the cen-
sors of the high command censored the contents of the press printed alrea-
dy and aff ected by the “legal” censorship. When they found it “dangerous”, 
they avoided its distribution arbitrarily. They confi scated specifi c issues 
and burnt them on railway stations near the capital. The army proceeded 
in similar way also in regions where also arbitrarily units of repressive 
services, the army and border police, contributed to avoid the distribution 
of “inconvenient” press.22
But free spread of speech was restricted not only by political cen-
sorship of press products. On the base of joint measure of the Ministry of the 
Interior and the high command of the National Army from 10 January 1920, 
also the telegraphic and phone contact was controlled, by special commit-
tees lead by army offi  cials and consisting of delegated members of individual 
21)  Národní listy, 59, 294, 10 December 1919, p. 4 (Politický přehled – Maďarsko – Horthy. Co 
se děje?).
22)  PÖLÖSKEI, p. 75.
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of 24 years was set also for women. But in their case, the assignment of the 
right to vote was conditioned by obligatory literacy.30 Passive right to vote 
was restricted by the age limit of 30 years.31 All members of the army, gen-
darmerie and police in active service were deprived of the right to vote.32 
Direct and secret right to vote was set by § 6.33 The election was based, also in 
correspondence with the decision of the second Friedrich’s cabinet, on majo-
rity election system.34
Although Huszár’s cabinet fi nally did not comply with one of the 
basic conditions of recognition of his government by the Entente Powers in 
autumn 1919, i.e. the provision of democratic election campaign, full open 
to all competing political subjects on the base of equal chances, it managed 
to lead the country to ordinary parliamentary election without further se-
rious internal commotions that would lead to further power confl icts in 
the society, and the election was the fi rst one based on general, equal and 
direct right of vote. But the fact is that the opportunity of free competition 
of all political parties was provided only pro forma. The most obvious ex-
ample of it was the almost permanent suppression of right to free and 
equal political competition particularly with regard to the Hungarian So-
cial Democratic Party whose candidates were very often provided from 
freedom of free movement and frequently detained and interned. The 
above stated governmental decree from 5 December 1919 was purposefully 
abused to political persecution in order to intimidate the social democratic 
candidates and their potential voters. Although the proposal had been ori-
ented particularly against communists, it was abused mainly against so-
cial democrats in practice.35
The social democrats responded to those practices oriented 
against them by leaving not only the concentration cabinet but also by 
withdrawing their candidates to the parliament on the base of the decision 
of the party leaders from 15 January 1920, thus boycotting the parliamen-
tary election. But as the election was compulsory for each authorized voter, 
social democracy did not invite their potential voters not to participate, 
30)  Ibidem, p. 879.
31)  Ibidem, § 2, p. 880.
32)  Ibidem, § 3, ibidem. 
33)  Ibidem, § 6, p. 881.
34)  Ibidem.
35)  I. ROMSICS, Magyarország története a XX. században. Budapest 2000, p. 135.
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mic reasons” was issued under No. 91383/ 1919. BM. on 5 December 1919.28 
The purposeful character of the internment decree was highlighted by the 
fact that it not only had not defi ned the cases justifying to internment but it 
did not defi ne the maximum time limit for which the interned person could 
be kept in custody either. That fact off ered naturally suffi  cient space for arbi-
trary assertion of such measures.
First ordinary post-war parliamentary elections in Hungary in January 1920
Only one year after declaration of independent Hungary, by the end of 1919, 
the country met the basic conditions for implementation of the fi rst post-
war standard parliamentary elections: relatively calmed turbulent Hungari-
an society, Rumanian occupational army away from the capital and mostly 
from eastern Hungary too and particularly the takeover of power by the go-
vernment cabinet recognized by the Entente, with activity spread on essen-
tial part of Hungary. Thus it was only Huszár’s government that got the con-
sent from the Entente Powers to call and implement the fi rst ordinary 
post-war parliamentary election in the country. Also Friedrich’s administra-
tion had striven to implement them, but without success. As it had not been 
recognized by the Entente Powers, it did not dispose of suffi  cient mandate to 
declare regular parliamentary election with results having the necessary 
international legal respect.
Nevertheless, the right to vote, on the base of which the fi rst post-
war parliamentary election took place in the country, had been standardi-
zed by the governmental decree of Friedrich’s cabinet No. 5985/1919. ME.29 
According to § 1 of the governmental decree, the right to vote was assigned 
to all men who had been holders of Hungarian citizenship for six months at 
the minimum, having permanent residence at one place for six months at 
the minimum and aged over 24 years. But in case of minimally twelve-week 
service in the battlefront, the age limit was reduced to 21 years. The age limit 
28)  See Rendeletek Tára, 1919, pp. 1076–1081, or p. 1084 (annex to gov. decree). According to 
the governmental decree, persons dangerous and suspicious with regard to state interests 
and interests of the society or with regard to the public order and safety, as well as persons 
arousing fears from the above stated perspective. (See § 2, or § 1 of the governmental de-
cree, ibidem, p. 1077, or p. 1076.)
29)  Ibidem, § 1, pp. 879–881.
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less both the results of the actual parliamentary election and the future po-
litical atmosphere in the country.37
The pre-election political scene of Hungary at the turn of 1919 and 
1920 was controlled by two central political directions: Christian-national and 
agrarian. The national Christians were represented by the party of Christian 
National Union (KNEP), established on 24 October 1919. The political interests 
of smallholders were patronaged by the Statewide Smallholder and Agrarian 
Party (OKgFP) that had turned away from the liberal-democratic direction af-
ter fusion with the Christian smallholders on 29 November 1919, claiming pu-
blicly allegiance to the Christian bloc. The Hungarian Social Democratic Party, 
reorganized after the fall of the Republic of Councils on 24 August 1919, had the 
most complicated position in the country. Its discredit caused by conspiracy 
with the Communist party on 21 March 1919 and its participation in the creati-
on of the Hungarian “Soviet“ Republic doomed it to the extreme margin of the 
political scene in the anti-revolutionary atmosphere. That occurred although 
social democracy claimed full allegiance to the original party program from 
1903 and representatives of the right wing of the party of the state apparatus 
became the new head of the party. The civic-democratic liberal political forces 
that were under constant pressure of ideological off ensive of the Christian-natio-
nal course and the state bodies controlled by it were markedly weakened. Their 
position was considerably weakened also by absent unity and by substantial 
fragmentation. The National Democratic Party, established on 10 October 1919, 
was the only successful political formation of the liberal-democratic current.38
The fi rst ordinary post-war parliamentary election in the coun-
try took place on 25–26 January 1920. But for the moment, the election 
could be held only in 164 electoral districts out of the total number of 219 
electoral districts. The remaining electoral districts were situated on the 
37)  The course of the election campaign is well illustrated by the following words from an 
article of the Národní listy newspaper (see Národní listy, 15, 20, 20 January 1920, p. 3 
(Politický přehled – Před volbami): “The censorship spoils issuing of election leafl ets, calls 
and brochures, distorting completely their contents and sense. Mentions on state form and 
republic are not admitted either. Uncomfortable candidates and persons who could suc-
ceed in the election are arrested.”
38)  Summarized survey on the political scene of Hungary in autumn 1919 see e.g. A. TÓTH, 
The Hungarian Political Stage of the Second Half of 1919 and the Results of the First Regular 
Post-War Parliamentary Elections in 1920, Prague Papers on the History of International 
Relations, 2009, pp. 350–365.
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but instructed them through their central newspaper, Népszava, thorough-
ly to boycott the election actively, i.e. to participate in the election if possib-
le, but to vote by crossing out the whole ballot paper.36 But the persecution 
by the state apparatus aff ected also candidates of liberal parties, besides 
the social democratic candidates. In some cases even the second main poli-
tical direction of the country, the smallholders, had problems with restric-
tion of free political competition.
The fi rst ordinary post-war parliamentary election of post-war 
Hungary refl ects the most markedly the irreconcilable and distinctive diff e-
rentiation of the Hungarian society based on the political belief of the popu-
lation that gave its specifi c character to the election. The fi rst standard post-
war election in Hungary, as well as the preceding canvassing constituted, 
thanks to the set governmental course, mainly election and canvassing 
against the communists, their social democratic “accomplices” and also 
against the “traitors” of the nation – liberals who, according to the Christian-
national politicians should clear the way or hand the governmental power 
over to the communists, thus causing the origin of the detested Hungarian 
“Soviet“ Republic. The Christian-national governmental course, as well as 
the National Army intervening markedly into the life of the country, exerted 
considerable eff ort to create the picture of the only possible path to salvation 
of Hungary, of the only possible alternative for the country, together with 
the Catholic Church not only during the canvassing but also during the who-
le period after the fall of the Republic of Councils: the alternative consisted 
in restoration or building of strong national Christian Hungary. As most 
inhabitants of the country had strong Christian belief and as the conserva-
tive political thinking had strong roots from the period of Austria-Hungary, 
it is natural that such purposeful off ensive of the crucial political forces, 
aided also by the uncompromising attitude of the international community 
towards Hungary, found fertile breeding ground and predestined more or 
36)  Népszava, 48, e.g. 17, 20 January 1920, p. 3 (A választások és a szociáldemokrata párt) or 
ibidem 19, 22 January 1920, p. 2. (Hogyan szavaznak a szociáldemokraták. Utmutató a 
választásokra.). During the election, ballots spoiled according to the instruction of social 
democracy were submitted by 71 000 voters for example in the capital.
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The structure of representation of individual social groups in the 
new Hungarian legislative assembly changed markedly as compared to the 
last election period of the dualistic Hungary. The representation of aristocra-
cy in the fi rst elected legislative assembly of post-war Hungary dropped 
strongly, by two thirds, from 15 % to 5 %. The representation of big and small 
landowners dropped more than by a half, from 36 % to 15 %. On the contrary, 
the number of deputies representing small farmers, i.e. smallholders, in-
creased markedly, from 1 % up to 15 %. So in 1920, the representation of 
smallholder classes of the society in the parliament achieved the percentage 
level of representation of aristocracy in the last lower chamber of the parlia-
ment of dualistic Hungary. But compared to 1910, the representation of the 
Catholic Church in the Hungarian legislative body increased markedly in 
1920, by almost two thirds, from 4 % to 11 %. And it was in 1920 when the 
fi rst woman was elected to the parliament.44
Restoration of constitutionality and election of temporary head of state
The fi rst post-war legitimately elected legislative assembly of the country 
was convoked festively to the 16 February 1920. Its primary task was to 
defi ne post-war Hungary from legal and constitutional perspective. It was 
expressed in the basic legal article of interwar Hungary, the so-called Hor-
thyan Hungary, No. 1920: I. tc. on restoration of constitutionality and tem-
porary arrangement of execution of supreme state power that was adopted 
by the National Assembly on 28 February 1920 and declared in the Code 
a day later. The origin of the basic act of legal and constitutional character 
was accompanied by complicated negotiations between both strongest po-
litical parties, KNEP and OFKgP. The Gordian knot of the negotiations was, 
from the beginning, particularly the issue of the head of state, characteri-
zed by sharp clash of views between the supporters of legitimism, i.e. sup-
porters of the Habsburgs, which means of the former Austrian Emperor 
Charles I, or Charles IV as the Hungarian king, and the supporters of nati-
onal kingdom who strove for free election of a new monarch of the country. 
Both those antagonistic camps originated from the strongest parliamenta-
ry parties. The legitimists included particularly the deputies and politici-
44)  ROMSICS, Magyarország, p. 135.
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territories occupied by the Rumanian and Yugoslavian army. The election 
could be called there only after the foreign armies would have left. The un-
equivocal winner of the election was the Christian bloc. OKgFP got the 
most posts in the post-war Hungarian National Assembly with restricted 
transitory two-year term of offi  ce. It occupied 78 posts in the National As-
sembly in total (47.56 %39). The candidates of KNEP occupied 73 posts 
(44.51 %) in total in the legislative body. To the contrary, the liberals failed 
the election completely, as was expected. Only 6 candidates (3.66 %) of the 
National Democratic Party got into the National Assembly. Nevertheless, 
the National Democratic Party became the second strongest political party 
in the capital, following the National Christians. It obtained 68 000 valid 
votes, i.e. 19% out of the 374 262 votes submitted in the Budapest electoral 
districts in the fi rst ballot.40
The smallholders won also in the Rear Tisza Region where the 
election was held between 13 June and 19 July 1920 in the 44 electoral 
districts. The central party of smallholders got further 27 mandates there. 
On the contrary, KNEP got only 8 mandates there. The election in the remai-
ning 11 electoral districts in the Baranya County in the south of the coun-
try was held almost one and half year later, on 30–31 October 1921. Small-
holders won them too, succeeding in 6 electoral districts. The KNEP party 
obtained only one mandate.41
The right of vote from 1919 was the most democratic right of vote 
applied on the territory of Hungary. On its base, 3 133 094 authorized voters 
could go to the ballot boxes, constituting almost 87 % of all inhabitants over 
24 years of age. To the contrary, the total number of authorized voters of for-
mer dualistic Hungary in 1910 was only 6.4 % of the total number of populati-
on. That means that from the total number of Hungary inhabitants at that 
time, 18 264 53342, only 1 162 241 could take part in the election to the former 
Hungarian Parliament.43
39)  The percentage expresses here and further in the text the percentage proportion of the 
mandates occupied out of the total number of all mandates of the legislative body.
40)  L. HUBAI, Magyarország XX. századi választási atlasza 1920–2000. I. köt., (MVA, I.) Buda-
pest 2001, pp. 25–26.
41)  Ibidem, p. 28.
42)  Without Croatia and Slavonia.
43)  M. RUSZKAI, Az 1945 előtti magyar választások statisztikája, Történeti Statisztikai Kö-
zlemények, 1959, 3, 1–2, p. 16.
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only to elect the temporary head of state in regent rank.49 In connection with 
arrangement of the issue of supreme state power in the country, the act defi -
ned the authority of the temporary head of state, i.e. defi ned the restrictions 
of rights of royal power for the regent. His basic authorities included appoint-
ment of the government and the right to return acts to the National Assembly 
to re-debate, except for acts related to state form of the country or of head of 
state. But the regent could return acts to the National Assembly only once.50 
In case the legislative body became inquorate, the regent could dissolve the 
National Assembly. But the regent could do that only after the deputies did 
not obey his appeal to restore the quorate character of the parliament.51 The 
right to adjourn parliament session had originally not been awarded to the 
regent. Nevertheless, on the base of Horthy’s antecedence of being elected to 
the top of the state, the regent was awarded, within extension of the range of 
his authorities, also the right to adjourn and terminate the session of the Na-
tional Assembly by the additional Act No. 1920: XVII. tc. from 18 August 1920, 
fully according to the right belonging to royal power in compliance with acts 
from the 19th century No. 1848: IV. tc., or 1867 : X. tc.52 
In the foreign political sphere, the temporary head of state was 
awarded the right to receive and send envoys. He could enter into ally and 
other agreements through the government, but only provided that they did 
not aff ect the matters falling under the authority of the legislative process. 
In such case, the regent depended on the consent of the National Assembly. 
Also in case of declaration of war, use of army outside the state borders or 
also in case of entering into peace treaty, the regent was imposed the duty of 
additional request for consent of the National Assembly.53
The regent could execute the executive power according to the law 
only through the ministry accounting to the National Assembly. All measu-
res and decisions of the temporary head of state, including the measures re-
lated also to armed forces, were legally valid only if countersigned by the 
responsible minister. But that condition did not concern the constitutional 
49)  Ibidem, § 12, p. 4.
50)  Ibidem, § 13, ibidem.
51)  Ibidem, pp. 4–5.
52)  Ibidem, 1920. évi XVII. törvénycikk az alkotmányosság helyreállításáról és az állami 
főhatalom gyakorlásának ideiglenes rendezéséről szóló 1920. évi I. t.-c. 13. §-ának mó-
dosításáról, p. 77.
53)  Ibidem, 1920: I. tc., p. 5.
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ans from the Party of Christian National Union and the supporters of free 
election of king the deputies and politicians from the Smallholder Party.
The adoption of the basic legal article of interwar Hungary No. 
1920: I. tc. completed the process of restoration of standard legal and consti-
tutional limits of functioning of the internal political life in the country. 
The act codifi ed particularly the current legal and constitutional position of 
Hungary. It stated the separation of the country from the Austrian-Hungari-
an state and the termination of both chambers of the land assembly of dua-
listic Hungary on 16 November 1918, recognizing the new temporary legis-
lative body of the country, the National Assembly, convoked on the base of 
the results of the January parliamentary election, as the exclusive legitimate 
representative body of national sovereignty.45 The act legitimized the period 
following after the fall of the Republic of Councils, from the arrival of István 
Friedrich to the position of Prime Minister on 7 August 1919, i.e. all govern-
ments constituted after that date and their decrees. On the other hand, it 
cancelled all legal measures of the Popular Republic46 and of the Republic of 
Councils in form of acts, decrees, as well as all other measures of legal cha-
racter of both those republics issued under other names. It ordered particu-
larly complete removal of so called popular decrees and popular acts from 
the national corpus iuris.47 The basic purpose of those provisions of Act No. 
1920: I. tc. was to restore legal continuity of post-war Hungary with the peri-
od before 31 October 1918, i.e. with dualistic Hungary.
The act arranged further the issue of the head of state. It stated that 
the execution of royal power had been interrupted on 13 November 1918, on 
the base of the offi  cial letter of the Emperor Charles I, written in the imperial 
castle at Eckartsau, to the east of Vienna, in which he had given up the direc-
tion of state matters of Hungary.48 But the legal article did not solve the issue 
of the head of state fi nally, but ad interim. It assigned the National Assembly 
45)  1920. évi Országos Törvénytár (Corpus Juris, CJ) 1920, 1920. évi I. törvénycikk az alkot-
mányosság helyreállításáról és az állami főhatalom gyakorlásának ideiglenes rendezéséről, 
preamble of the Act, p. 1 and § 11, 4.
46)  The Hungarian Popular Republic was originated by so called Chrysanthemum Revolution 
and declared on 31 October 1918. Its existence was terminated on 21 March 1919 by es-
tablishment of the Republic of Councils.
47)  Ibidem, § 9 and 10 of the Act, pp. 3 and 4.
48)  Ibidem, preamble of the Act, p. 1.
122
wbhr 02|2011
123
from 1918, passed by the government of Count Mihály Károlyi on 16 Novem-
ber 1918.56 By that legal act, Hungary was declared a republic and Popular 
Republic of Hungary became offi  cial name of the state. Count Mihály Károlyi 
became the fi rst post-war head of state or fi rst Hungarian president; he was 
charged with administration of supreme state power in the country tempora-
rily by the Hungarian revolutionary National Council on 11 January 1919. On 
21 March 1919, the civic-democratic popular republic was substituted by the 
socialist-communist experiment in form of the Hungarian Republic of Coun-
cils. The supreme state representative of the Republic of Councils was Sándor 
Garbai who presided the Revolutionary Governing Council, i.e. the “soviet” 
government consisting of popular commissioners. It was in that case equiva-
lent to the position of Prime Minister. After the resignation of the government 
of the Republic of Councils and the accession of Gyula Peidl’s unicolour social-
democratic government on 1 August 1919, the Popular Republic of Hungary 
was restored, which the Government claimed allegiance to by the governmen-
tal decree No. 1/1919 ME, based on the decision of the Cabinet from 2 August 
1919.57 Let us emphasize that, from the perspective of signifi cance at that 
time, the name of “popular republic” should express that the Hungarian Go-
vernment claimed allegiance to the principle of civic parliamentary democra-
cy. Both Peidl’s and Károlyi’s government wanted to dissociate from the old 
“aristocratic”, i.e. monarchist dualistic Hungary and the national-right-wing 
forces that wanted to link post-war Hungary, from constitutional perspective, 
to the social-political system of pre-October Hungary.
The only unambiguous legal allegiance of Hungary to the monar-
chist state form was represented, until autumn 1921, by the governmental 
decree No. 2394/1920. ME, passed by Sándor Simonyi-Semadam’s govern-
ment, the fi rst post-war Hungarian government originated from the results 
of the parliamentary election, based on its decision adopted at its second 
Cabinet session on 16 March 1920. The fact that act No. 1920: I. tc. did not 
emphasize expressis verbis the state form of the country required, in context 
with the offi  cial naming of governmental bodies and authorities, additional 
emphasis on the fact that restoration of legal continuity of the country with 
the period before 31 October signifi ed also restoration of the monarchist 
state form. So the governmental decree declared clearly: “The act of restorati-
56)  CJ 1918. Budapest, 1918, p. 202.
57)  MOL, K 26, ME., 1203. cs., 1919 – I. – 3887, folio 2–4 a Hivatalos Közlöny, 1919, 109, p. 3 
August, title page.
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rights belonging to the regent from the position of commander-in-chief, i.e. 
the measures concerning direction, command and internal organization of 
the National Army. In spite of the monarchist character of the regent rank 
and the monarchist political system of interwar Hungary, the regent was not 
awarded the right to grant titles of nobility. The temporary head of state was 
also denied the right to award general amnesties. The regent’s person was 
inviolable and enjoyed the same criminal protection as the monarch. In case 
of violation of law or constitution, he could be held responsible by the Natio-
nal Assembly. But the relevant initiative of hundred deputies as a minimum 
was needed for that.54
The temporary head of state of post-war Hungary, confi rmed in the 
provision of Act No. 1920: I. tc., was elected by the National Assembly on 
1 March 1920. Admiral Miklós Horthy de Nagybánya got the position. Out of 
the total number of the 141 votes submitted, 131 were for Horthy, 7 deputies 
gave their vote to Count Albert Apponyi, the president of the Hungarian 
peace delegation, and 3 votes were invalid. Horthy’s election to the regent 
position was confi rmed by the parliament on 5 March by the second act ad-
opted, Act No. 1920: II. tc.55
It can be striking that the basic legal article based on constitutio-
nal law of so-called Horthyan Hungary did not emphasize explicitly the state 
form of the country or offi  cial name of the state, which was Hungarian King-
dom. The monarchist structure of interwar Hungary is referred particularly 
in the declaration of the preamble of the Act confi rming interruption of 
execution of royal power in the country by 13 November 1918. But the Act 
did not emphasize verbatim that the monarchist state form of Hungary, in 
compliance with the legal continuity with dualistic Hungary, persisted. In 
connection to the reference to future fi nal solution of the issue of head of 
state, the Act operated only with formulations like “fi nal solution of executi-
on of supreme power in the country” and “head of state”, i.e. not with formu-
lations of “monarchist power” or “monarch”.
To get compact picture with regard to constitutional form of inter-
war Hungary, so called Horthyan Hungary, let us remember also the prece-
ding declared constitutional forms of post-war Hungary. The fi rst post-war 
constitutional defi nition of Hungary was expressed in the popular act No. I. 
54)  Ibidem.
55)  See ibidem, 1920. évi II. törvénycikk nagybányai Horthy Miklós úrnak kormányzóvá 
történt megválasztásáról, pp. 7–8.
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Trianon, constituted the basic obstacle of the internal political consolidati-
on process or cooperation of the governmental coalition.
The conclusion of the peace treaty was under way already. Hunga-
ry was invited to the Paris Peace Conference on the base of the decision of the 
Supreme Council of the Paris Peace Conference from 1 December 1919, alt-
hough Budapest had been invited to send its peace delegates to Paris on 
1 May 1919 already. But at that time, the invitation of the Supreme Council 
was stopped by the Vienna Entente missions reluctant to deliver the invitati-
on to the then “soviet” Cabinet of Budapest.59 Hungary signed the peace trea-
ty with the Allied and Associated Powers on 4 June 1920, although it did not 
agree with its uncompromising provisions. The Hungary peace convention 
became publicly known as the Peace Treaty of Trianon, by the place of its 
signature, the Grand Trianon Palace at Versailles near Paris. 60
The greatest share in the process of strengthening of the foundati-
ons of the consolidation process of the country appertains to Count Pál 
Teleki’s government that had substituted the temporary Simonyi-Semadam’s 
cabinet after the June and July parliamentary election in the Rear Tisza 
Region on 19 July 1920. The central item of the government program of the 
fi rst Teleki’s cabinet was fi rstly to restore legal order in the country, to ex-
tend the political base of the Christian-national political course by suppres-
sing the non-standard political power of the military and semi-military 
structures, achieved during autumn 1919, under simultaneous restoration 
of the dominant political power of large farmers, aristocracy and fi nancial 
capital representatives, as well as further correction of political space for 
civic-democratic opposition powers and social-democratic movement.61
The basic legal frame for strengthening of the Christian-national 
political line in the social-political life of the country was provided to 
Teleki’s government by the extended validity of all legal measures origina-
ted on the base of act No. 1912: LXIII. tc. on extraordinary measures for the 
59)  For the issue of invitation of Hungary to the Paris Peace Conference see A. Tóth, A Huszár-
kormány meghívása a párizsi békekonferenciára (1919. december – 1920. január), Száza-
dok, 2005, 139, 5, pp. 1477–1495.
60)  For the history and progress of conclusion of peace treaty between the Allied and Associ-
ated Powers and Hungary in English compare I. ROMSICS, The Dismantling of Historic 
Hungary: The Peace Treaty of Trianon, 1920, Boulder, Colorado 2002.
61)  Gy. RÁNKI (ed.), Magyarország története, 1918–1919, 1919–1945, Vol. I., Budapest 1978, pp. 
426–427.
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on of constitutionality and temporary arrangement of execution of supreme 
state power, 1920: I. stated that the execution of royal power had been inter-
rupted on 13 November 1918, but Hungary had not changed its thousand-
year-long state form and had not cancelled the royal majesty and the royal 
power as legal institution.”58
Hungary declared its monarchist political system as higher state 
form only on the occasion of dethroning of the Habsburgs under the pressu-
re of foreign countries after the second restoration attempt of the ex-king 
Charles the Habsburg in October 1921 in act No. 1921: XLVII. tc. “On extinc-
tion of monarch rights of His Majesty Charles IV and the successor rights of 
the Habsburg House” of István Bethlen’s government, passed by the deputies 
on 6 November 1921. The § 3 of the act declared preservation of the monar-
chist state form of Hungary, postponing the issue of occupation of the vaca-
ted throne for a later point in time.
Start of fi nal consolidation of the country and outline of its progress
The implementation of the fi rst ordinary post-war parliamentary election in 
the country at the beginning of 1920, the constitutional defi nition of post-
war Hungary together with the temporary solution of the issue of head of 
state by legal article No. 1920: I. tc. and the election of the temporary head of 
state constituted the indispensable constitutional base for consolidation of 
internal political and later also economic life of the country. On 15 March 
1920, the eighth post-war Hungarian cabinet under participation of both 
strongest parliamentary parties, KNEP and OKFgP, under Sándor Simonyi-
Semadam as Prime Minister, was appointed the regent of the country to ad-
minister the country until the parliamentary election in the Rear Tisza Re-
gion. But such indispensable basic constitutional acts did by far not 
constitute the last meritorious steps “codifying” the form of interwar Hunga-
ry. Hungary was to engage in conclusion of the peace “talks” and signature 
of the peace treaty, implementation of the above stated parliamentary electi-
on also on the gradually left Hungarian territories, as well as in fi nal soluti-
on of the issue of head of state that, after the signature of the Peace Treaty of 
58)  The quotation from the record of the concerned Hungarian Cabinet. MOL, K 27, ME., MT., 
16 March 1920 (box No. 125), pp. 28–29.
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Nevertheless, the actual completion of the process of consolidation 
of the country pertains only to the long-year Prime Minister, István Bethlen. 
Count Bethlen’s accession to the Prime Minister position on 14 April 1921 
terminated the period of relatively frequent changing of Prime Ministers 
and Governments, seven of the former64 and nine of the latter65 being 
changed in the period from 31 October 1918 to 14 April 1921. Count Bethlen 
was appointed the Hungarian Prime Minister after the resignation of Teleki’s 
cabinet after the unsuccessful fi rst restoration attempt of ex-emperor Char-
les I in Hungary in spring 1921, and held the position of Prime Minister al-
most ten years, until 24 August 1931.
Count Bethlen, the Prime Minister, main architect of the political 
system of interwar Hungary, so called Horthyan Hungary, was defender of 
democratic civic parliamentarianism. But he advocated its political regula-
tion in order to direct the share of individual social groups in political ad-
ministration of the country. For that reason, Bethlen opposed radical exten-
sion of civic freedoms including the right to vote, as its adaptation to the 
political-power needs of the conservative Christian-national political course 
constituted the basic frame to the semi-authoritative direction of the demo-
cratic principles of civic parliamentarianism in interwar Hungary. The re-
gulation of the right to vote should further eliminate particularly the share 
of left-wing opposition, i.e. social democracy, in the political power of the 
country. But its objective was to regulate also the political infl uence of civic-
liberal political directions, i.e. of political groups based particularly on tho-
se pre-war political currents that accentuated principles of classical civic 
liberalism, as against the governmental regulated liberalism of that time. 
So those objectives were identical to the objectives of the Christian-national 
governmental set of pre-election period, i.e. of the turn of 1919 and 1920. 
The political system of so called Horthyan Hungary, completed and 
strengthened by Bethlen on the base of the above stated purposeful politi-
64)  Six Prime Ministers without the President of the Revolutionary Governing Council of the 
Hungarian Soviet Republic, Sándor Garbai (Count Mihály Károlyi, Dénes Berinkey, Gyula 
Peidl, István Friedrich, Károly Huszár, Sándor Simonyi-Semadam and Count Pál Teleki – 
the Prime Ministers arranged chronologically by their terms in offi  ce).
65)  Without the Revolutionary Governing Council that governed between 21 March 1919 
and 1 August 1919 in three formations. The Prime Minister István Friedrich presided 
during his term in offi  ce (from 7 August 1919 to 24 November 1919) three government 
teams in total.
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case of war, or on extraordinary regime of state power with reference to 
“extraordinary” conditions in the country caused by the events of the years 
1918-1919. It was established by the legal article No. 1920: IV. tc., passed by 
the National Assembly on 28 April 1920, under Simonyi-Semadam’s govern-
ment. The provision of the act from 1912 was extended by one year as from 
ratifi cation of the peace treaty.62
In compliance with the above stated program, Teleki’s government 
under the regent’s support proceeded fi nally to liquidation of country and 
Budapest brachial troops or to their transformation, liquidating also the 
best-known centres of brachial power during the second half of the year. 
Although those measures of the Government did not lead to full elimination 
of extreme-right-wing forces from political power and political life, their 
manoeuvring space was markedly restricted, particularly with regard to un-
desirable adventurous arbitrary repressive events of the so called white ter-
ror, provoking undesirable negative response even abroad. The stabilization 
of internal political situation of the country under direction and in spirit of 
the Christian-national course should be supported also by the bill of Teleki’s 
cabinet for more effi  cient protection of state and social order, adopted by the 
National Assembly as legal art. No. 1921: III. tc. on 16 March 1921. The act 
stated that he who instigated or lead to organization or movement directed 
at violent subversion or destruction of legal order of the state and the society, 
particularly at violent establishment of exclusive government of any social 
class, committed crime under pain of prison of up to fi ve years. In cases of 
armed movement, its leaders could be condemned to prison for ten to fi fteen 
years. The act included also provisions for protection of the state and the 
nation. According to its wording, he, who stated or spread such untrue fact 
that would harm the reputation or credit of the Hungarian nation, commit-
ted off ence under pain of prison of up to fi ve years. If such action were direc-
ted at instigating any foreign state or organization to unfriendly action 
against the Hungarian nation, the originator of such action could be con-
demned to prison for up to ten years. But if such action of any foreign state 
or organization had provoked unfriendly action against the Hungarian na-
tion, its originator could be condemned even to life imprisonment.63
62)  For the provisions of Act No. 1912: LXIII. tc. see CJ 1912. Budapest, 1912, pp. 691–710. For 
the wording of Act No. 1920: VI. tc. CJ 1920. Budapest, 1920, pp. 26–27.
63)  RÁNKI, pp. 431–432. BALOGH, p. 126.
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lism political system of Hungary abroad, which could have been used not 
only by the Hungarian democratic emigration.
The need to provide at least for minimum level of constructive cha-
racter of opposition policy of social democracy, i.e. its minimum state loyal-
ty, was necessary towards foreign countries last but not least as at that time, 
social democratic parties constituted essential parliamentary force or were 
even governmental parties in most countries. Thus any open political ob-
struction by left-wing opposition would be undesirable for Christian-natio-
nal Hungary also from the foreign political point of view. So Bethlen was 
interested in holding social democracy in play, in spite of gradual restriction 
of the right to vote. That means, it was necessary to allow not only its parti-
cipation in the legislative body but also to provide for constructive line of its 
opposition policy, not damaging state interests of Hungary. Nevertheless, at 
the beginning of Bethlen’s era even social democracy was aware of the fact 
that it rather incurred harm by its intentional absence from parliamentary 
life and that its passive role was rather counter-productive for it. By the end 
of 1922, opposition agreement was entered into between Bethlen’s govern-
ment and the Hungarian social democracy. The agreement called Bethlen-
Peyer’s pact delimited coexistence of both parties, of the government repre-
senting central Christian-national political line and social democracy, in the 
set limits of functioning of the political system of the country. Within the 
pact, the social democracy promised, among other things, that it would sup-
port foreign policy of the government, it would not promote republican sy-
stem, it would withdraw from political cooperation with civic-liberal oppo-
sition and it would not initiate political strikes. The government promised 
the socialists, among other things, not to prevent the organizational functio-
ning of social-democratic party and trade unions and the distribution of the 
central newspaper of the party, Népszava.67
That internal political strategy of Bethlen’s policy trying to preser-
ve maximally the impression of full implementation of democratic princip-
les of civic parliamentarianism, or full preservation of its basic construction 
unit, political pluralism in Hungary had primarily new foreign political 
concept of Hungary in the background. The new political line did not give 
cold shoulder to the revisionist line, but concentrated its interest pragmati-
cally primarily on integration into new structures of foreign political relati-
onships of the Versailles peace system, within which it wanted to establish 
67)  RÁNKI, pp. 448–451.; BALOGH, pp. 131–133; PÖLÖSKEI, pp. 180–183.
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cal regulation of functioning of democratic principles of civic parliamenta-
rianism gave fi nal basic practical constitutional frame to the constitutional 
principles confi rmed in the fi rst legal article of constitutional character No. 
1920: I. tc. adopted by the post-war legislative body of the country for the 
period of subsequent 24 years, i.e. until the country was occupied by the 
Germans during World War II in 1944.
The political system of interwar Hungary, completed during 
Bethlen’s era, was based on the basic Bethlen’s thesis on democracy, about 
which he said in his program speech before the deputies of the national As-
sembly that: “It cannot signify blind power of the mass, blind power of undi-
rected masses.”66 “Blind power of masses” must be perceived here not only as 
left-wing political groups representing particularly the labourers, but also 
the civic-democratic political groups representing particularly the interests 
of middle classes of towns and villages that had not participated in central 
political administration of the country in decisive manner so far. But the 
policy of the Prime Minister Bethlen was, as against the left-wing oppositi-
on, characterized not only by unilateral adverse correction of limits of free 
political competition. Count Bethlen, the Prime Minister, was primarily 
good political pragmatist and strategist, aware of the need of preservation of 
the principles of pluralistic political life of the country not only with regard 
to the political image of Hungary abroad, but also from the perspective of 
social reconciliation in the society. The society was to experience several 
years of diffi  cult period of economic consolidation, with the main necessary 
victim consisting of lower social classes, i.e. of the part of society constitu-
ting fertile grounds particularly for social-democratic movement. Therefore 
Bethlen could not proceed to restrict radically the political activity of the 
main speaker of those classes, social democracy, because such step could 
lead to uncontrollable and undesirable explosion of politically and pointedly 
organized social dissatisfaction and resistance directed by social democratic 
party. That would have markedly negative impact on economic life and on 
the desired economic stabilization of the country. But power checkmate of 
social-democratic movement from the offi  cial political life could lead to ge-
neral undesirable harm to the credit of civic parliamentarianism and plura-
66)  Az 1920. évi febr. hó 16-ára hirdetett Nemzetgyűlés naplója. (Stenographic records from the 
National Assembly session convoked for 16 February). Vol. IX (21 March 1921 – 12 May 
1921, 166. – 190th session.) Budapest, Az Atheneum Irodalmi és Nyomdai Részvénytársulat 
Könyvnyomdája, 1921, 175th session, p. 187.
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mentary majority had to be ensured, to provide the Government with fi rm 
and reliable support. Therefore the main eff ort of the Prime Minister Count 
István Bethlen consisted from the beginning in creation of a politically con-
solidated and homogenous unifi ed governmental party that would be 
bound, with regard to the government, by the jointly binding political line 
and program, thus providing the political interests of the governmental 
cabinet with stable political support in the National Assembly. The Christi-
an-national and agrarian governmental coalition originated from the elec-
tion was delicate and inhomogeneous and its heterogeneity not only in es-
sential political issues often paralyzed the activity of the Government and 
of the parliamentary majority. The fi rst Bethlen’s attempt for creation of 
unifi ed governmental party in summer 1920 ended only at the level 
of a rather loose political union of both biggest political parties, KNEP and 
OFKgP, and it did not last long due to the then insurmountable contradic-
tion in the royal issue.
The chance of implementation of Bethlen’s plan increased in au-
tumn 1921 when the National Assembly adopted the above stated act of de-
throning. So the Gordian knot that had paralyzed the eff orts to unify both 
governmental political parties into one subject was solved. Nevertheless, due 
to two restoration attempts of ex-Emperor Charles I in 1921, Bethlen devia-
ted politically from the “central” party of the Christian-national political 
course because of the legitimists, concentrated particularly around the 
KNEP party, and got closer to smallholders, who were mostly supporters of 
free election of the king. So the Prime Minister saw the foundation of a futu-
re united governmental party not in the KNEP party any more, but in 
Nagytádi’s Smallholder Party he had wanted to decompose and unite with 
KNEP. Therefore he focused his policy on the eff ort for his political line to be 
accepted by smallholders, or for him to be accepted by the smallholders. He 
succeeded in the end at the beginning of 1922, and on 22 February 1922 he 
joined the Smallholder Party together with several conservative liberal or 
conservative deputies, becoming its political leader. The Smallholder Party, 
expanded and changed in such way, went on acting under the name of Chri-
stian Smallholder, Agrarian and Civic Party (Kersztény-keresztyén Kisgazda, 
Földműves és Polgári Párt), or in short as United Party (Egységes Párt, EP). So 
the narrowly agrarian smallholder party focused primarily on country clas-
ses became a party with much broader social platform, the so-called collec-
tion party. The united governmental party created by Bethlen was active for 
the whole ten-year period of so-called Bethlen’s era in unchanged form and 
on unchanged base. But it held the role of central united governmental party 
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basic standard multilateral relationships and try to break through its fo-
reign political isolation. Hungary expressed the new political course on 23 
May 1921 already, when Bethlen’s government fi led application to the League 
of Nations. By that, together with signature and subsequent ratifi cation of 
the peace treaty in 1920, Hungary confi rmed in fact the newly constructed 
international political system based on mutual respect of political and terri-
torial independence of the member states. Such turn of the Hungarian fo-
reign policy directed by the Prime Minister Count Bethlen constituted, from 
the perspective of surviving emotions of the Hungarian society due to si-
gning and ratifi cation of the peace treaty with the Allied and Associated Po-
wers, uncompromising for Hungary, clear sign of the upcoming new phase 
of the policy of the Hungarian governmental set, directed by the Prime Mi-
nister, Count Bethlen, and the Regent Horthy. But by that, the Hungarian 
government virtually positioned itself against the radical national-right-
wing political groups promoting open revisionist policy. Open political acti-
vity of those groups became undesirable and dangerous to the Government 
from the perspective of its new foreign political line. The sober and realistic 
aspect of the new political course of interwar Hungary was evidenced also 
by liquidation of the fi rst restoration attempt of the ex-Emperor Charles I in 
spring 1921 as well as of his subsequent second attempt for restoration of his 
royal power in Hungary in autumn 1921, after which the political infl uence 
of the legitimists on central policy was gradually markedly restricted, which 
could be seen also in the appointment of the non-legitimistic Count Bethlen 
as Prime Minister by Regent Horthy instead of the legitimistic Prime Mini-
ster, Count Teleki.68
But the Prime Minister Bethlen focused, within his eff ort to 
strengthen and consolidate the internal political scene in order to provide 
for standard political environment, not dangerous to the Christian-natio-
nal consolidation interests of the state inwards and outwards, not only on 
political pacifi cation of the opposition social democracy. For the govern-
mental policy to be long lasting, continuous and effi  cient, also stable parlia-
68)  BALOGH, pp. 129–130. For details on the issue of restoration attempts of Charles I in Hun-
gary and his foreign political dimension in 1920 see M. ÁDÁM, Les deux coups d’Etat de 
l’ex-roi Charles et la Petite Entente. Acta Historica Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, 
1985, 31, 1–2, pp. 33–85. For newer data on the fi rst restoration attempt see A. TÓTH, Czecho-
slovak Policy and the First Restoration Attempt of Charles Habsburg in Hungary in the Spring 
1921. Prague Papers on the History of International Relations, 2007, pp. 241–279.
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whose political line depended on the Prime Minister and from the Regent of 
the country in the background.71
The limits of the widest democratic right to vote in the history of 
the Hungarian parliamentarianism from 1919 were not preserved in the 
course of so called Horthyan Hungary, and they were gradually markedly 
restricted. That tendency is clearly declared by the fact that twenty years later, 
Hungary had 400 000 less authorized voters than in 1920. That means that, 
while the number of citizens had grown by 15 % between 1919 and 1939, the 
number of authorized voters had dropped by 12 % in the same period. The di-
stinctive diff erence could be seen in the second post-war parliamentary elec-
tion in 1922 already. In the election of 1922, the right to vote was awarded to 
about 750 000 inhabitants less than in the fi rst post-war parliamentary elec-
tion. So only 29.5 % of the total number of inhabitants of the country were 
authorized to vote. The right to vote was assigned to all men over 24 years of 
age then, but the age limit was shifted to 30 years for women. A condition of 
obtaining the right to vote was, among other things, at least 10 years of citi-
zenship and 2 years of permanent residence. And the right to vote was not 
secret any more, or better said it was not secret in blanket. The election was 
secret only in Budapest and surroundings and in statutory towns. The smal-
lest fall of the proportion of the number of authorized voters and the number 
of inhabitants of the country occurred in inter-war Hungary at the election of 
1926, when only 26.6 % of inhabitants had the right to vote.72
So before 1922, the Prime Minister Bethlen succeeded in creating 
standardized stable political environment respecting outwards the princip-
les of pluralism political system, but on the other hand not restricting the 
political goals and plans of Bethlen’s governmental course. After creating 
some political base, Bethlen’s governmental apparatus could fully focus on 
stabilization of the disastrous economic situation of the country.
The stabilization of economic and fi nancial situation of Hungary 
was not easy, but both the economy as the fi nances were restored successful-
ly in the course of the fi rst half of the Twentieths. The basic tool of the Go-
vernment to stabilize the economic life of the country was high infl ation. 
While, as stated above, 100 crowns were equal to 3,1 Swiss francs in June 
1920, the value of 100 crowns dropped to 2,34 in summer 1921, in 1922 to 
0,56, in 1924 to 0,08 and in 1927 to 0,0065 Swiss franc. In consequence of 
71)  BALOGH, pp. 135–137.
72)  Ruszkai, pp. 28–30; Balogh, p. 134; Romsics, Magyarország, pp. 222–225.
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for the whole interwar period, although in the Thirtieths it shifted strongly 
to the right as against the Twentieths.69
The basic internal political goal of the Prime Minister, Count Beth-
len, to establish power-political balance on the internal political scene, while 
preserving the dominant political position of the existing power forces, i.e. 
to reduce the political infl uence of town and country middle classes and to 
increase the political infl uence of traditional higher social classes as against 
reality, e.g. the eff orts of the political elite from 1919 and 1921, was comple-
ted by the second post-war parliamentary election in 1922 on the base of the 
reduced right to vote. The composition of the new National Assembly refl ec-
ted the results of Bethlen’s policy combined with autocratic elements that 
should ensure guaranteed stable majority political power to the central go-
vernmental course. The political forces dangerous to Bethlen’s policy, pre-
venting it from assertion in the National Assembly due to reduced right to 
vote70, either fell out from the new legislative body or shrank into insigni-
fi cant parties or party fractions. So in the newly elected National Assembly, 
the representation of the legitimists uncomfortable to the Government both 
from internal and from foreign political perspective was markedly restric-
ted, as well as the representation of the democratic smallholder political di-
rection endangering the large farmer groups, the neo-conservative Christi-
an socialists endangering the interests of big capital and last but not least 
the extreme anti-Semitic groups uncomfortable to the governmental course. 
Only 40 % deputies from the fi rst election period were re-elected to the se-
cond National Assembly. Left-wing opposition represented by deputies of so-
cial democracy was newly elected to the legislative body. But their opposition 
policy was regulated from the perspective of state interests by the above sta-
ted so called Bethlen-Peyer’s opposition pact. So the implementation of the 
second postwar parliamentary election in the country in 1922 confi rmed 
the basic line of the political system of the country: the legislative power 
depended on the legislative body, the legislative body was controlled by the 
United Party, the united governmental party depended on the Government 
69)  PÖLÖSKEI, pp. 171–177. RÁNKI, pp. 442–443. BALOGH, p. 133. Gy. FÖLDES, L. HUBAI, Par-
lamenti választások Magyarországon 1920–1998, Budapest 1999, pp. 86 and 92.
70)  For adaptation of the right to vote on occasion of the second postwar parliamentary elec-
tion and for the history of political negotiations in re compare FÖLDES, HUBAI, pp. 87–91.
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same year, GDP per inhabitant in Czechoslovakia was 586, in Rumania 331, 
in Yugoslavia 341, in Bulgaria 306 and in Poland 350 dollars per capita (dol-
lar from 1960).73
Conclusion
The political system of interwar Hungary, so called Horthyan Hungary, the 
foundations of which were laid at turn of 1919 and 1920 and completed du-
ring the internal political consolidation process in 1920 to 1922 was based, 
from constitutional perspective, on civic parliamentarianism, with a system 
of several political parties, with a parliament and a government accounting 
to the parliament, sovereign justice and pluralism cultural life. But the func-
tioning of standard political institutions of civic parliamentarianism of in-
terwar Hungarian Kingdom was purposefully regulated by the supreme sta-
te power through anti-democratic measures and interventions. The main 
anti-democratic element of the political system of so-called Horthyan Hun-
gary was the restriction of competition of political parties through unequal 
conditions or through elimination of considerable part of the society from 
the competition. The basic tool for regulation of political power of individual 
social and interest classes of the society consisted in the relevant restriction 
of civic freedoms particularly through public manner of voting in the electi-
on in most electoral districts, correction of freedom of press and later even 
through religious and racial discrimination. But the political system of so 
called Horthyan Hungary did not include the main fascist and national-so-
cialist elements leading to absolute totalitarization, i.e. offi  cial ideology, sys-
tem of one party, liquidation of parliamentarianism, elimination of plura-
lism of cultural life and its complete state control, assertion of armed 
pressure terrorist system for intimidation of the society.74
73)  ROMSICS, Magyarország, pp. 152–156. BALOGH, pp. 139–140 and 142. ROMPORTLOVÁ, 
SLÁDEK, pp. 65–67.
74)  ROMSICS, Magyarország Története, Budapest 2007, p. 806.
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infl ation combined with import bans and import restrictions, so called in-
fl ation prosperity was established in 1921 to 1922. Thanks to those measu-
res, industrial production of the country was almost doubled and the agri-
cultural production was increased by 20 % between 1920 and 1924. Both of 
the sectors of the national economy, the industry and agriculture, approa-
ched or achieved 70% of the level of pre-war Hungarian economy by 1924. 
But in 1923 and 1924, the infl ation policy became unsustainable. The unco-
vered print of banknotes did not manage to cover huge price increase and 
money lacked in circulation. The lack of cash in commerce and industry 
provided ideal fi eld to loans with interest rates between 20–40 %. As compa-
red to pre-war years, the banknote circulation increased up to thirty times. 
But the high increase of prices (up to twenty times as compared to pre-war 
period) deepened markedly the social situation of lower social classes that 
became unbearable. Real salaries of 1923 corresponded to only half the va-
lue of the pre-war salaries. It was practically not realizable any more to im-
plement practically the consequent restriction of state budget expenses and 
to rely on own forces, as the Finance Minister Lóránd Hegedüs had tried in 
1921 without success. Hungary, like Austria in 1922 and later Rumania, Po-
land and Bulgaria, had to proceed to solve its burdensome fi nancial situati-
on through international loan; Bethlen’s government applied for it in 1923. 
In 1924, the state stopped covering its expenses by printing uncovered bank-
notes and stopped off ering large infl ation credits. It established a formally 
independent central bank of the country, the Hungarian National Bank that 
became the only standard subject in the country with the right to print 
banknotes. By summer 1924, the Government had met the basic conditions 
of using foreign loan and could make use of its account as from June 1924.
The state economy got balanced by the end of 1924, and the period 
of prosperity was started. About a fourth of the international loan covered 
the state budget defi cit, and the rest was used primarily to pay old debts and 
to build schools, hospitals and public buildings, etc. In the course of the se-
cond half of the Twentieths, further loans fl owed into the country, in total 
amount of about 3 billion in the new currency, pengő, but they were unfor-
tunately used mainly in non-productive sphere. However, high interest per-
centage was paid for such credits, and whole industrial branches were 
pledged. Nevertheless, the positive growth of Hungarian economy in the se-
cond half of the Twentieths is well illustrated by the GDP calculated per one 
inhabitant (according to P. Bairoch), ranking Hungary at top place in the 
space of (not only) south-eastern Europe. While in 1925, the GDP in Hungary 
was 365 dollars per inhabitant; in 1924 it was 424 dollars already. In the 
